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Parker v. State:
COURT OF
APPEALS
REAFFIRMS
COMMITMENT TO
ABSOLUTE
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
FOR JUDICIAL
ACTS.

-::::-

..

. -..1......

,_"

--~

--- - - - - - - - -- - - -

In Parker v. State, 337
Md. 271,653 A.2d436 (1995),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a circuit court
judge is entitled to absolute immunity from tort actions, both
under the Maryland Tort Claims
Act and 42 U.S.c. § 1983. lnso
holding, the court reaffirmed
its commitment to absolute judicial immunity for judicial actions.
On April 14, 1988,
Doris Parker was convicted in
district court for driving in excess of the speed limit and was
fined $150. She appealed her
conviction to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City. After failing to appear on the date set for
appeal, the circuit court determined that she had waived her
right to an appeal and entered
judgment against her. By August 5, 1988, Parker had not
paid the fine. On that date,
Judge Roger W. Brown of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
issued a warrant for her arrest.
The Baltimore County Police
Department was unable to serve
her with the warrant despite
several attempts.
On May 31, 1989,
Parker filed a motion with the
circuit court to strike the dismissal and reinstate proceedings. Judge Brown granted the
motion and quashed the earlier
warrant for her arrest. An appeal de novo was held before
another circuit court judge on
September 22, 1989, at which
Parker was acquitted of the
speeding offense.
On December 7, 1989,
however, the Sheriff of Balti-

more City appeared before
Judge Brown and requested a
second arrest warrant on the
basis of her "continued" failure
to pay the $150 fine. Judge
Brown issued the warrant without calling the clerk's office or
reviewing the docket entries
which reflected Parker's September 22, 1989, acquittal.
Parker was later arrested at her
home and detained at a Baltimore County police precinct
until she paid the fine. Judge
Brown ultimately quashed the
arrest warrant on January 19,
1990.
Parker filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against the State of Maryland
under the Maryland Tort Claims
Act, Code (1984, 1993 Repl.
Vol., 1994 Cum. Supp.), §§ 12101 through 12-110 ofthe State
Government Article, alleging
false imprisonment, false arrest
and negligence on the part of
Judge Brown. She also sued
under the Civil Rights Act of
1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the
erroneous issuance of the warrant. The court ultimately dismissed the action with prejudice.
Parker then appealed the
circuit court's dismissal of her
action to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland. Parker
argued that Judge Brown was
not entitled to judicial immunity because he lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the case
and personal jurisdiction over
Parker when he issued the warrant. The court of special appeals rej ected this argument and
held Judge Brown absolutely
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immune from suit. Additionally, the court held that judicial
immunity attached if the judge
had general subject matter jurisdiction regardless of whether or not he also had personal
jurisdiction.
Parker then appealed to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, arguing that the judge
could not be held immune from
suit because he lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant for her
arrest. Concerned by the approach of both the petitioner
and Court of Special Appeals to
the issue of judicial immunity,
the court granted the petition
for a writ of certiorari.
The court began its analysis by focusing on Parker's
state law claims under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The court
emphasized that the principle
of absolute judicial immunity
from civil liability has been a
part of the common law for
several centuries. Parker, 337
Md. at 277, 653 A.2d at 439.
The court further noted that the
Supreme Court recognized and
adopted the principle of judicial immunity in Bradley v.
Fisher, 68 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1872), which has become the
leading American case on the
subject. Parker, 337 Md. at
280, 653 A.2d at 440. Furthermore, the court concluded that

the common law principle of
absolute judicial immunity for
judicial acts has been reaffirmed
in Maryland. Id. at 284, 653
A.2d at 442. The court then
distinguished between qualified
immunity accorded to public
officials and absolute immunity granted to judges. The court
emphasized that absolute judicial immunity, unlike qualified
immunity, applies regardless of
the nature of the suit. !d. As
justification for this greater level of immunity, the court emphasized the need to " ... forestall
endless collateral attacks onjudgments through civil actions
against the judges themselves."
Id. at287, 653 A.2dat443. The
court further suggested that alleged errors could be challenged
through other mechanisms
within the judicial system, including removal procedures and
the appellate process. Id.
In rej ecting Parker's argument that Judge Brown
lacked jurisdiction to issue a
warrant for her arrest, the court
noted that the issuance of arrest
warrants is specifically within
the jurisdiction of the circuit
judge. Id. at 287, 653 A.2d at
444. Thus, the court held that
Judge Brown was entitled to
absolute judicial immunity, and
Parker's claims under the Maryland Torts Claims Act were

properly dismissed. Id.
The court then addressed Parker's federal law
claim under the Civil Rights
Act of1871, 42 U.S.c. § 1983.
Recognizing that section 1983
did not itself provide for immunities, the court stated that the
Supreme Court" ... has consistently applied the common law
concept of absolute judicial immunity, in its traditional form,
to cases arising under section
1983." Id. at 288,653 A.2d at
445. Consequently, the court
held that Judge Brown was also
immune from suit under
Parker's § 1983 claim against
him. Id. at 290, 653 A.2d at
445. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland.
In Parker v. State, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that a circuit court judge
could not be held civilly liable,
under either state or federal law,
for performing a judicial act.
Adhering to common law principles, the court reaffirmed the
principle of absolute judicial
immunity set forth by the Supreme Court over one hundred
years ago. In so doing, the court
maintained a longstanding principle necessary for detached and
impartial decision making in
disputes between adverse parties.
- Julie Furst
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